
[This is the conclusion to my independent study project, “Lessons in Political Stagnation: An Investigation into USAID’s Alternative Development Programs in the Chapare of Bolivia.” Alternative Development, one of four components to the USG's anti-drug policy, is the name for projects aimed at getting coca farmers, or cocaleros, to grow other crops besides coca.]
When I wrote my proposal for this project, my title was "Alternative Approaches to Alternative Development." I started this project with this idea that the well acknowledged problems of inefficiency of the USAID's AD programs were simply a matter of different approaches and understandings of the two sides, that of USAID and the Bolivian government, and of the campesinos and their leaders, respectively.
What I found, however, was quite different. In the first place, the division between the two sides is not that simple, as I never should have so naïvely assumed. Moreover, there is clarity between all sides, including American and Bolivian governments, as well as campesino leaders, regarding what is happening with respect to the development of the Chapare region. Everyone already knows the causes of the most serious problems, namely the USG policy to not work with the local municipal governments, due to their inferred connections with MAS and Evo Morales, and thus from where solutions must come. This, however, does not mean that they are following these solutions. Instead, a web of political relations that oscillate between loyalty and subordination, indifference and vehement opposition, create tensions and reduce the productivity and efficiency of the programs to nil.
USAID's AD programs in the Chapare were created to fight against drug trafficking. According to all the statistics, and, more importantly, the people of Chapare themselves, however, the cultivation of coca in this area comes out of an economic necessity. Instead of treating the situation as an economic problem, the USAID programs continue to treat the situation primarily as a drug problem, and their reports continue to evaluate of the efficiency of its AD programs by listing the number of eradicated hectares of coca first, and only secondly, the economic benefits of the families in Chapare. (USAID Strategic Plan Draft) Of course American programs are going to have their own objectives, but if USAID wants to effectuate changes in the Chapare region and reduce the net amount of coca cultivation, it must work with the people themselves, putting the objectives of the economic necessities of these people as its first priority, with the understanding that this is the best way to achieve the American objectives, instead of insisting, in contradiction with Law 1008, upon policies of forced eradication before there are sustainable economic alternatives for the people of Chapare.
If USAID can achieve the policy mentioned in its draft Strategic Plan of working with the municipal governments and giving ownership of these projects to the people themselves, the clear consensus is their programs could achieve much with respect to development in Chapare, and consequently a net reduction in coca production. However, after twenty years of ineffective (and unsuitable) policies, we have to hope that petty and unfounded political grudges on the parts of all involved parties are not going to further impede the progress of these programs. But our hope is strained. According to Mr. Coca, a campesino leader, the situation as it stands now is overly politicized. Mr. Aguirre of USAID went farther in saying that the situation how has become a political problem, and not an economic or narcotrafficking problem.
Whatever the specific classification of the current situation, we can say that there is a political stagnation, compounded with a suffocating rhetoric. This rhetoric comes at times in the form of legitimate complaints regarding persistent aggravations, and other times this rhetoric has become nothing more than blatant falsehoods that serve only as justification for one side to build up their own arguments and disregard those of others involved.
In the middle of all this are the people of Chapare. Their quality of life remains deplorably low while many spend much to talk of a progress of development that is still far from what the people of Chapare know in their daily lives. But, until everyone realizes that this is about a people trying to lead lives more or less normal and more or less stable, and that Chapare is not their own region to experiment or effectuate their own policies or programs or movements, nothing much is going to change, and moreover, nothing much is going to be able to develop.
When I wrote my proposal for this project, my title was "Alternative Approaches to Alternative Development." I started this project with this idea that the well acknowledged problems of inefficiency of the USAID's AD programs were simply a matter of different approaches and understandings of the two sides, that of USAID and the Bolivian government, and of the campesinos and their leaders, respectively.
What I found, however, was quite different. In the first place, the division between the two sides is not that simple, as I never should have so naïvely assumed. Moreover, there is clarity between all sides, including American and Bolivian governments, as well as campesino leaders, regarding what is happening with respect to the development of the Chapare region. Everyone already knows the causes of the most serious problems, namely the USG policy to not work with the local municipal governments, due to their inferred connections with MAS and Evo Morales, and thus from where solutions must come. This, however, does not mean that they are following these solutions. Instead, a web of political relations that oscillate between loyalty and subordination, indifference and vehement opposition, create tensions and reduce the productivity and efficiency of the programs to nil.
USAID's AD programs in the Chapare were created to fight against drug trafficking. According to all the statistics, and, more importantly, the people of Chapare themselves, however, the cultivation of coca in this area comes out of an economic necessity. Instead of treating the situation as an economic problem, the USAID programs continue to treat the situation primarily as a drug problem, and their reports continue to evaluate of the efficiency of its AD programs by listing the number of eradicated hectares of coca first, and only secondly, the economic benefits of the families in Chapare. (USAID Strategic Plan Draft) Of course American programs are going to have their own objectives, but if USAID wants to effectuate changes in the Chapare region and reduce the net amount of coca cultivation, it must work with the people themselves, putting the objectives of the economic necessities of these people as its first priority, with the understanding that this is the best way to achieve the American objectives, instead of insisting, in contradiction with Law 1008, upon policies of forced eradication before there are sustainable economic alternatives for the people of Chapare.
If USAID can achieve the policy mentioned in its draft Strategic Plan of working with the municipal governments and giving ownership of these projects to the people themselves, the clear consensus is their programs could achieve much with respect to development in Chapare, and consequently a net reduction in coca production. However, after twenty years of ineffective (and unsuitable) policies, we have to hope that petty and unfounded political grudges on the parts of all involved parties are not going to further impede the progress of these programs. But our hope is strained. According to Mr. Coca, a campesino leader, the situation as it stands now is overly politicized. Mr. Aguirre of USAID went farther in saying that the situation how has become a political problem, and not an economic or narcotrafficking problem.
Whatever the specific classification of the current situation, we can say that there is a political stagnation, compounded with a suffocating rhetoric. This rhetoric comes at times in the form of legitimate complaints regarding persistent aggravations, and other times this rhetoric has become nothing more than blatant falsehoods that serve only as justification for one side to build up their own arguments and disregard those of others involved.
In the middle of all this are the people of Chapare. Their quality of life remains deplorably low while many spend much to talk of a progress of development that is still far from what the people of Chapare know in their daily lives. But, until everyone realizes that this is about a people trying to lead lives more or less normal and more or less stable, and that Chapare is not their own region to experiment or effectuate their own policies or programs or movements, nothing much is going to change, and moreover, nothing much is going to be able to develop.